Manfred Holler introduced the Public Good index as a proposal to divide a public good among players. In its unnormalized version, i.e., the raw measure, it counts the number of times that a player belongs to a minimal winning coalition. Unlike the Banzhaf index, it does not count the remaining...

For the classical power indices there is a disproportion between power and relative weights, in general. We introduce two new indices, based on weighted representations, which are proportional to suitable relative weights and which also share several important properties of the classical power...

The design of fair voting rules has been addressed quite often in the literature. Still, the so-called inverse problem is not entirely resolved. We summarize some achievements in this direction and formulate explicit open questions and conjectures

This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class as well. Second, we focus on the special case of...

We study minimum integer representations of weighted games, i.e. representations where the weights are integers and every other integer representation is at least as large in each component. Those minimum integer representations, if the exist at all, are linked with some solution concepts in...

We combine the parametric Barvinok algorithm with a generation algorithm for a finite list of suitably chosen discrete sub-cases on the enumeration of complete simple games, i.e. a special subclass of monotone Boolean functions. Recently, Freixas et al. have proven an enumeration formula for...

Weighted voting games are frequently used in decision making. Each voter has a weight and a proposal is accepted if the weight sum of the supporting voters exceeds a quota. One line of research is the efficient computation of so-called power indices measuring the influence of a voter. We treat...

Several power indices have been introduced in the literature in order to measure the influence of individual committee members on the aggregated decision. Here we ask the inverse question and aim to design voting rules for a committee such that a given desired power distribution is met as...

We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the activity. The goal is to assign agents to activities based on...

Given a system where the real-valued states of the agents are aggregated by a function to a real-valued state of the entire system, we are interested in the influence of the different agents on that function. This generalizes the notion of power indices for binary voting systems to decisions...