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simple asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in the effectiveness of their efforts? For two-player contests the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390708
This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research … suppliers. We also compare other common contests, in particular, fixed-prize tournaments and auctions. Like bonus tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420558
This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420571
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324483
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that … economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals …&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325768
This paper reviews the relatively small literature on sabotage in contests. It looks at both the formal game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328791
results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two assumptions are imposed on the information structure. First, the players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332037
power of Nash equilibrium observed in Tullock contests. In our standard contest treatment, only 7% of choices are consistent … huge behavioral variation typically observed in Tullock contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332613
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333027
This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333728