We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent...

The notion of mediated talk in which players communicate through a mediator before starting the game is introduced. It shows that a deterministic mechanized mediator receiving private inputs and producing public outputs can generate any rational correlated equilibrium with rational probabilities...

This note studies relations between lim "V [subscript n]" and the lower long-run average value ("V" [underlined]) in dynamic programming. It is shown that a certain bounded variation conditions of {"V [subscript n]} implies that lim "V [subscript n] [is equal to] "V" [underlined].

This paper provides a folk theorem for two-player repeated games in which players have different discount factors. In such games, players can mutually benefit from trading payoffs across time. Hence, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs is typically larger than the convex hull of the...