We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and … highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the innovation. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes and … payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive …

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and … highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the innovation. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes and … payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive …

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and … highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the innovation. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes and … payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive …

potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … the degree of competition between suppliers, as well as other more practical indirect ways to stimulate innovation. We … discuss the effects of standard setting activities by large, often public, procurers on innovation races. We evaluate how …

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and … highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the innovation. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes and … payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive …

The process of innovation is driven by two main factors: new inventions and institutions supporting the transformation … been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public contests can mitigate a … semi-public contest mechanism but refrain from direct public funding of contests. …

We consider innovation contests for the procurement of an innovation under moral hazard and adverse selection … random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We compare two procurement mechanisms -- a fixed prize and a first …

, competition leads to faster innovation, because the investor has less of a need to delay expensive investments. The investor …

In many contests a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be …

We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated to different groups … the bids (i.e. there is no statistical discrimination), and she has no monetary incentive to favour the members of her own … group (the bidders are symmetric). We observe nonetheless some discrimination by auctioneers, who tend to assign the prize …