group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in …-like emotions influence punishment behavior much stronger when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in … impact on reciprocity, improving economists ability to predict behavior taking emotions also into consideration. …

group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in …-like emotions influence punishment behavior much stronger when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in … impact on reciprocity, improving economists ability to predict behavior taking emotions also into consideration. …

group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in …-like emotions influence punishment behavior much stronger when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in … impact on reciprocity, improving economists ability to predict behavior taking emotions also into consideration. …

differentconsequences on welfare. What is more, we are also the first to address how emotions influence the effectiveness of punishment in … demonstrate that emotions of guilt and anger differently affect subsequent contributions dependent on the social environment. …

. While there is conflicting experimental evidence on the temporal stability of cooperation preferences in public goods … literature by testing whether social identity impacts on cooperation preferences in public goods provision. Specifically, our … random, in and out group matching protocols. Our findings indicate that cooperation preferences are not stable across these …

. While there is conflicting experimental evidence on the temporal stability of cooperation preferences in public goods … literature by testing whether social identity impacts on cooperation preferences in public goods provision. Specifically, our … random, in and out group matching protocols. Our findings indicate that cooperation preferences are not stable across these …