This paper characterizes environmental regulations which induce polluting Bertrand competitors to invest efficiently in environmental R&D. Post-innovation benefits to raising rivals' costs provide firms with incentives to innovate. Although optimal behavior cannot be elicited with pollution...

We study when and how pure non-horizontal mergers, whether cross-product or vertical, can deter new entry. Organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition. Because heightened competition deters entry, mergers can occur in equilibrium even when, absent entry...

This paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender/investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability, there is moral hazard, and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price but is nondecreasing in...

This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce...

This paper presents an empirical study of population growth and environmental change using cross-sectional district-level data from South, Central and West India. Environmental change is measured using a satellite-based "greenness" index. Unlike prior work, the analysis treats population and...

State-level statutes provide firms that engage in environmental self-audits, and that self-report their environmental violations, with a variety of different regulatory rewards, including "immunity" from penalties and "privilege" for information contained in self-audits. This paper studies a...