weaker for managers with longer tenure. I consider an optimal incentive contract for money managers, and I provide an … compensation. In the optimal contract, flows become more sensitive to performance when the manager faces stronger incentives from … the compensation contract. With learning, the manager's incentives become stronger after good performance, so that a …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the …