bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all … enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool …-subject pool, police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games. With exogenous institutions, police commissioners …

cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where … antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing … punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all … enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool …-subject pool, police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games. With exogenous institutions, police commissioners …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all … enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool …-subject pool, police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games. With exogenous institutions, police commissioners …

pillar is internalised norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the … motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish … inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere …

pillar is internalized norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the … motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish … inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere …

anger, ‘social’ emotions like shame and guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of …