This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the...

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We first show that defection survives as the unique equilibrium of the stage game if at least one player...

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the...

A well-known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that...

Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as predominantly driven by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social...

We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy version of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that DG giving is correlated with cooperation in the repeated game when no cooperative equilibria exist, but not when...