In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...

In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...

This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (tells the truth) and the receiver is possibly naive (follows messages as if truthful). The characterization of message-monotone equilibria in the perturbed games explain several important aspects of strategic...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose, by drawing on the resource-based view (RBV) and economic regulation theory, that companies with political connections are more likely to enter into industries with high entry barriers, as they are more likely to obtain entry permits from the...

SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2005-060 Portfolio Value at Risk Based on Independent Components Analysis Ying Chen* ** Wolfgang Härdle* Vladimir Spokoiny* ** * CASE - Center for Applied Statistics and Economics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin ** Weierstraß -...

Purpose – Voluntary employee turnover can be a challenge for all industries but high employee turnover has been a special concern in the hospitality industry, which is the context of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to incorporate a “trickle-down” perspective into the conventional...