beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in … emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies …

beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in … emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies …

beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in … emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies …

beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in … emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies …

beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in … emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies …

beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in … emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies …

beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in … emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies …