We examine the formation of hub-and-spoke and multilateral green technology international agreements. Green R&D provision produces two types of positive externalities, a global public good (i.e., reduction of carbon dioxide emissions) and spillovers in technology agreements. We utilize the...

The Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (PCPN) concept is extended to allow for the emergence of overlapping coalitions in equilibrium. We apply the extended concept to study the efficiency and stability properties of environmental agreements to control emissions of correlated continental...

Under the 'new normal' in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional...

The mini-revolution in 1994 that gave Republicans control of Congress for the first time in forty years, and which led to the enactment of the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) as part of the Contract with America, was designed in part to revive some foundational constitutional...

Games of public good provision, collective action, and collusion share concern for the free rider that shirks on its obligations. According to the folk theorem, the free rider problem can be resolved through punishment mechanisms. Versions of the folk theorem have been applied when monitoring is...

This paper provides evidence on strategic interaction among local school districts. The analysis makes use of a significant change in the institutional environment for school districts in Michigan in 1996, when the state established a voluntary inter-district choice program. The school...

This paper simultaneously analyses the determinants of intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the votes that these transfers earn in subsequent legislative elections in Portugal. Results suggest that election year increases in transfers by the central government to municipalities secure added...

We study the political economy of policy innovations during the U.S. welfare reform in 1996. Specifically, we investigate how reputation concerns among governors influence the decision to experiment with welfare policies. In line with a political agency model, our empirical results suggest that...

Although reassignment of policy instruments among governments in many federations is a recurring event, there is no widely accepted, positive model of the phenomenon. This stands in contrast to the well established body of work on the normative theory of the efficient federal assignment. In this...

We analyze whether mayors’ prior occupation in the local public administration matters for their performance. In theory, mayors’ professional background may shape their competence in bureaucratic tasks. We use the example of grant receipts for visible investment projects for which mayors...