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We extend a well known differential oligopoly game to encompass the possibility for production to generate a negative environmental externality, regulated through Pigouvian taxation and price caps. We show that, if the price cap is set so as to fix the tolerable maximum amount of emissions, the...
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The conference of Kyoto 1997 instutionalized a new and important economic instrument for environmental protection, the Joint Implementation Progran (JI). The concept of Joint Implementation involves a bilateral or multilateral deal in which countries facing high pollution abatment costs invest...
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The paper deals with division situations where individual claims can vary within closed intervals.Uncertainty of claims is removed by compromising in a consistent way the upper and lower bounds of the claim intervals.Deterministic division problems with compromise claims are then considered and...
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The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between several actors (players) which intend to minimize their emissions (E <Subscript>i</Subscript>) caused by technologies (T <Subscript>i</Subscript>) by means of expenditures of money (M <Subscript>i</Subscript>) or financial means, respectively. The index stands for the i-th player, i=1, … ,n....</subscript></subscript></subscript>
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The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between several actors (players) which intend to minimize their emissions (E i ) caused by technologies (T i ) by means of expenditures of money (M i ) or financial means, respectively. The index stands for the i-th player, i=1, …...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847604