We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in individual bidding behavior. In a repeated design, an...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiring a company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition of both, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higher prices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

Multi-license ascending auctions have been criticized because they allow bidders to reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, it has been argued that the ascending auction is a suitable format for a seller who wants to exploit preemptive motives. Incumbent firms...

A considerable number of U.S. borrowers still choose adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) over fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) even when interest rates are historically very low. This study examines the psychological reasons for the popularity of ARMs by testing the Prospect theory’s reflection...

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria...