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Handing out guns at a knife fight : behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399065
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Handing out guns at a knife fight : behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402672
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502711
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020 - Revised version
retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration. Incorporating reciprocity preferences into the theory explains the observed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318860
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020
retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration. Incorporating reciprocity preferences into the theory explains the observed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012373280
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398359
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398533
Cover Image
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531676