We model a reputation game, in which a sequence of short-run players chooses if to interact with a long-run player. Although beliefs may be identical, choices may be different, as not-interacting can lead the long-run player to improve on effort.

We analyze a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream retailers. Demand is uncertain but each retailer receives an informative private signal about the state of the demand. We construct an incentive compatible and ex ante balanced mechanism which induces the retailers to...

Vor kurzem ließ das Bundesarbeitsgericht den lange Zeit geltenden Grundsatz der Tarifeinheit in seiner Rechtsprechung fallen. So ist es nun möglich, dass in einem Betrieb unterschiedliche Tarifverträge für die angehörigen verschiedener Gewerkschaften gelten. Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund...

We analyze a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic...

Vor kurzem ließ das Bundesarbeitsgericht den lange Zeit geltenden Grundsatz der Tarifeinheit in seiner Rechtsprechung fallen. So ist es nun möglich, dass in einem Betrieb unterschiedliche Tarifverträge für die angehörigen verschiedener Gewerkschaften gelten. Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund...

We analyze a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic...

We analyze a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream retailers. Demand is uncertain but each retailer receives an informative private signal about the state of the demand. We construct an incentive compatible and ex ante balanced mechanism which induces the retailers to...