-qualified students subject to budget and capacity constraints. Student-proposing deferred acceptance is stable and strategy-proof for … students, but the set of stable allocations is large and the scope for manipulation by colleges is substantial, even in large … deferred acceptance, choosing another stable allocation would increase the number of admitted students by at least 3% …

strategies, showing that the cutoff signals implement all implementable state-independent distributions of students across …

matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly …

Turkey show many pieces of evidence that students construct their lists strategically according to their admission chances … our preference estimates suggests that students from low SES households are better off under a student sorting rule only …

We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a matching is computed and students have option … to either finalize their matches or participate to the next period. Students participating to an additional run of the … evaluate the former French college admission system, where students could finalize their matches at different dates up to two …

mechanism that allows students to provide incomplete but expandable preference lists (EPLs). In contrast to the standard one …-shot (direct-revelation) or multirun (sequential-like) designs, the EPL mechanism matches students and colleges in a continuous … all students to the clearinghouse, whereas every student only needs to provide an incomplete initial preference list …