By introducing search and matching frictions in both the labor and the credit markets into a cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE model, we provide a novel explanation of the incomplete pass-through from policy rates to loan rates. We show that this phenomenon is ineradicable if banks possess some...

By introducing search and matching frictions in both the labor and the credit markets into a cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE model, we provide a novel explanation of the incomplete pass-through from policy rates to loan rates. We show that this phenomenon is ineradicable if banks possess some...

By introducing search and matching frictions in both the labor and the credit markets into a cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE model, we provide a novel explanation of the incomplete pass-through from policy rates to loan rates. We show that this phenomenon is ineradicable if banks possess some...

The interplay of imperfections in several markets is the new frontier of New Keynesian DSGE model research. Following a suggestion put forward by Wasmer and Weil (2004) in a partial equilibrium environment, we introduce search and matching frictions in both the labour and the financial markets...

By estimating a Markov-switching model, we provide new evidence on the nonlinear effects of monetary policy shocks on asset prices and on their bubble component. We show that regime-dependence is mainly driven by the states affecting the interest rate equation. We also show that, following a...

We study the e¤ects of underground activities on labour market dynamics in a RBC model with search frictions in the labor market, bargained wage and quadratic hiring costs. Underground activities, which allow agents to (partially) evade taxes, are modelled through a moonlighting production...

We introduce some elements of Prospect Theory into a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition in the good market and real wage rigidities due to (right to manage or efficient) wage bargaining, or to efficiency wages. We show that, under these types of labor market frictions, an...

We show that in a modified Mortensen–Pissarides model the bargaining weights depend on the players’ loss-aversion parameters. These weights can hence be calibrated without resorting to an assessment of players’ bargaining powers, which have proved difficult to empirically establish.