We investigate the quality provision behavior and its implications for the occurrence of collusion in competitive health care markets where providers are assumed to be altruistic towards patients. For this, we employ a laboratory experiment with a health care market framing where subjects decide...

We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation...

Recent health policy reforms try to increase consumer choice. We use a laboratory experiment to analyze consumers’ tastes in typical contract attributes of health insurances and to investigate their relationship with individual risk preferences. First, subjects make consecutive insurance...

Mixed payment systems have become a prominent alternative to paying physicians through fee-for-service and capitation. While theory shows mixed payment systems to be superior, empirically, causal effects on physicians’ behavior are not well understood when introducing mixed systems. We...

Most common physician payment schemes include some form of traditional capitation or fee-for-service payment. While health economics research often focuses on direct incentive effects of these payments, we demonstrate that the opportunity to sort into one’s preferred payment scheme may also...

We present causal evidence on the effect of performance pay on health care provision, from a behavioral experiment with a representative sample of German primary care physicians. Randomly assigning physicians to two performance incentive levels, we analyze how performance pay, compared to...

Mixed payment systems have become a prominent alternative to paying physicians through fee-for-service and capitation. While theory shows mixed payment systems to be superior, empirically, causal effects on physicians' behavior are not well understood when introducing mixed systems. We...

Recent health policy reforms try to increase consumer choice. We use a laboratory experiment to analyze consumers' tastes in typical contract attributes of health insurances and to investigate their relationship with individual risk preferences. First, subjects make consecutive insurance choices...

This paper systematically studies how performance pay, complementing either baseline feefor-service or capitation, affects physicians' medical service provision and the quality of care. Using a series of controlled experiments with physicians and students, we test the incentive effect of...