Abstract: Using a newly constructed dataset on German hospitals, which includes 24 process and outcome indicators of clinical quality, we test whether quality has increased in various clinical areas since the introduction of mandatory quality reports and the online publication of part of the...

This paper analyzes the incentive for a cartel agreement between hospitals. For this purpose we extend a quality competition model developed by Montefiori (2005). We investigate that collusion on a low provided quality level will lead to higher profits for both hospitals. Therefore both...

Using a newly constructed dataset on German hospitals, which includes 24 process and outcome indicators of clinical quality, we test whether quality has increased in various clinical areas since the introduction of mandatory quality reports and the online publication of part of the collected...

A necessary condition for competition to promote quality in hospital markets is that patients are sensitive to differences in hospital quality. In this paper we examine the relationship between hospital quality, as measured by publicly available quality ratings, and patient hospital choice for...

In this paper, we study the rational for an incumbent to launch a second brand when facing potential entry in a market with quality differentiated products and a fringe producer. Depending on market size, costs for a second brand and a potential entrant's setup cost the incumbent might use a...

In this paper, we study the rational for an incumbent to launch a second brand when facing potential entry in a market with quality differentiated products and a fringe producer. Depending on market size, costs for a second brand and a potential entrant’s setup cost the incumbent might use a...

This investigation pits Cournot oligopolists against each other in a model of quality and R&D choice. A firm gains a strategic advantage over its rival when it is able to sell in more countries due to the jointness of quality improvements across production locations. Trade barriers that restrict...

In this work we emphasize why market coverage should be considered endogenous for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in vertical differentiation models and discuss the implications of this endogeneity for that analysis. We consider contexts without quality costs and also contexts with convex...

In this paper we develop a model of a vertically differentiated industry where the production of higher quality goods needs a higher fraction of specialized labour. In the first stage, firms choose the quality of their products, in the second, both good prices and skilled workers’ wages are...

In a vertically differentiated oligopoly where the high quality variant of the good requires the use of the high quality labour (available in¯fixed supply) ¯firms may either all supply the same quality or di®erentiate their product. Only di®erentiated outcomes can be optimal, but the number...