In a successive vertical oligopoly, a set of sellers produce some input to be transformed into a final product by a set of buyers. On this two-sided market, a firm's profit increases with the number of firms of the other type and decreases with the number of firms of its own type. We examine the...

We test the effect of entry on the tariff choices of incumbent cellular firms. We relate the change in the breadth of calling plans between 1996, when incumbents enjoyed a duopoly market, and 1998, when incumbents faced increased competition from personal communications services (PCS) firms....

We examine the effects of entry on the pricing behavior of incumbent legacy airlines in a market where the newcomer is a rapidly expanding low-cost carrier - the Brazilian airline industry in the early 2000s. We estimate the timing and the determinants of price responses to entry allowing them...

In this paper we study price competition, equilibrium market configurations and entry when firms compete in vertically-di¤erentiated markets producing complementary goods. We consider two complements and start from a configuration where the market for one complement is a duopoly, whereas the...

Many oligopoly theories predict that there will be a positive correlation between market size and the equilibrium number of firms, and some also imply that competition is more intense in larger markets. We test these predictions with a sample of 535 driving schools in 249 markets. With an...

This paper is motivated by the empirical regularity that industries differ greatly in the level of firm turnover, and that entry and exit rates are positively correlated across industries. Our objective is to investigate the effect of sunk costs and, in particular, market size on entry and exit...

In German electricity submarkets for residential customers standard contracts offered by former monopolists are the more costly option for customers who have not switched to an alternative contract yet. As most German households are served with this contract type we follow the Limit Pricing...

We present an infinite horizon model that studies the competition between a relatively ineffective incumbent Credit Rating Agency (CRA) and a sequence of entrant CRAs that are potentially more effective but whose ability in appraising default risk is unproven at the time they enter the market....

This paper examines whether there is a natural barrier to entry in the credit rating industry. We consider an in nite horizon model in which each period, an original incumbent faces competition from an entrant randomly selected from a pool of ex ante identical potential entrants. The incumbent's...

Here, we study vertical foreclosure in a dynamic setup with learning-by-doing production technologies. There is a downstream monopoly and an upstream duopoly, where manufacturers produce differentiated products and can gain proficiency through the accumulation of their production. We study the...