In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants’ contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This...

A common finding of the literature on dishonesty is that groups are moredishonest than individuals. We revisit this finding by making explicit thethird-party harmed by subjects' dishonesty: a local charity. With this explicitthird-party, we do not find groups to be more dishonest than...

Groups are often found to be more rational than individuals. In lying games, this implies that groups are more dishonest. We scrutinise this conclusion in a setup where there are true moral concerns associated with dishonest behaviour. In contrast to prior studies, we do not find groups to be...

This paper investigates how the possibility of affecting group composition combined with the possibility of repeated interaction impacts cooperation within groups and surplus distribution. We developed and tested experimentally a Surplus Allocation Game where cooperation of four agents is needed...

Competition between groups is ubiquitous in social and economic life, and groups are typically not created equal. Here we experimentally investigate the implications of this general observation on the unfolding of symmetric and asymmetric competition between groups that are either homogeneous or...

Using a repeated public goods game, we experimentally examine how apologies support mutual cooperation in groups. In two treatments where participants can send either public apologies or private apologies, contributions increase by 0.37 and 0.61 standard deviations respectively, compared to a...

We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments, we study four- and eight-person groups in high and low marginal per capita return (MPCR) conditions. We find a positive effect of group size in the low MPCR condition, as in...