I model the strategic interaction between firms, that face decisions on investment, forward contracts and spot market quantities. For an investment decision that takes place after firms have contracted forward but before firms compete on the spot market (medium term investment), competition...

I model the optimal semi-collusive strategy of firms using forward contracts in volatile markets. It has been shown that forward contracts can be used to stabilize a collusive agreement under deterministic (Liski and Montero, 2006) as well as under stochastic market conditions (Aichele, 2012)....

Assuming deterministic demand Liski and Montero (2006) show that forward trading is able to facilitate collusion. We present a more concise model incorporating the main reason for forward trading: Uncertainty. In general, fluctuations make collusion harder to sustain (Rotemberg and Saloner,...

I model the optimal semi-collusive strategy of firms using forward contracts in volatile markets. It has been shown that forward contracts can be used to stabilize a collusive agreement under deterministic (Liski and Montero, 2006) as well as under stochastic market conditions (Aichele, 2012)....

I model the strategic interaction between firms, that face decisions on investment, forward contracts and spot market quantities. For an investment decision that takes place after firms have contracted forward but before firms compete on the spot market (medium term investment), competition...

I model the optimal semi-collusive strategy of firms using forward contracts in volatile markets. It has been shown that forward contracts can be used to stabilize a collusive agreement under deterministic (Liski and Montero, 2006) as well as under stochastic market conditions (Aichele, 2012)....

I model the strategic interaction between firms, that face decisions on investment, forward contracts and spot market quantities. For an investment decision that takes place after firms have contracted forward but before firms compete on the spot market (medium term investment), competition...

Commodity markets are characterized by large volumes of forward contracts as well as high volatility. They are often accused of weak competitive pressure. This article extends the existing literature by analyzing tacit collusion of firms, forward trading and volatility simultaneously. The...

Assuming deterministic demand Liski and Montero (2006) show that forward trading is able to facilitate collusion. We present a more concise model incorporating the main reason for forward trading: Uncertainty. In general, fl uctuations make collusion harder to sustain (Rotemberg and Saloner,...

Assuming deterministic demand Liski and Montero (2006) show that forward trading is able to facilitate collusion. We present a more concise model incorporating the main reason for forward trading: Uncertainty. In general, fl uctuations make collusion harder to sustain (Rotemberg and Saloner,...