intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank's incentive …Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information …

intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank's incentive …Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information …

intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank's incentive …Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a … institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated …

intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank’s incentive …Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information …

intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank’s incentive …Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having … defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff …. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff …. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a … institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff …. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number …