This paper extends the canonical literature on public incentives for firm-level abatement by introducing fiscal policy constraints and public abatement technologies. To increase acceptance of the emission tax policy, tax revenues are earmarked for public abatement or public good provision and no...

The design of US unemployment insurance (UI) policy--which features benefits assigned as a percentage of past wages up to a cap--engenders tests for spillovers from policy variation to workers who are not directly treated. Using variation in state-level UI parameters recorded in state session...

This paper investigates the influence of monetary policy on the optimal behavior of a monopolistic bank. More specifically, we discuss how the overdraft rate and the minimum reserve requirements affect the equilibrium values of lending rate and deposit rate as well as the corresponding...

We study a dynamic pricing problem for a class of products with stable consumption patterns (e.g., household items, staple foods). Consumers may stock up the product at current prices for future consumption, but they incur inventory holding costs. We model this situation as a dynamic game over...

We study rebate mechanisms according to which a monopolist selling a product introduces rebates as function of the volume of buyers. This enables the firm to induce payoff externalities that ordinarily do not exist. The monopoly firm sells an indivisible good to a mass of consumers with...

We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single‐agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an...

Purpose – The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamic behavior of a bounded rational monopolist with a general nonlinear demand and quadratic cost functions reflecting diseconomies of scales.Design/methodology/approach – We suppose that locally the monopoly firm uses a...

In this paper we analyze a stochastic dynamic advertising and pricing model with isoelastic demand. The state space is discrete, time is continuous and the planning horizon is allowed to be finite or infinite. A dynamic version of the Dorfman-Steiner identity will be derived. Explicit...

We consider the pricing problem faced by a monopolist who sells a product to a population of consumers over a finite time horizon. Customers are heterogeneous along two dimensions: (i) willingness-to-pay for the product and (ii) arrival time during the selling season. We assume that the seller...

The static model of two sided markets proposed by Rochet and Tirole analyses optimal pricing of a monopolistic platform at the equilibrium point. Their framework implicitly assumes that for each prices set by the platform, the equilibrium number of users on each side will be unique. However,...