Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

This paper empirically analyzes the effects of a banking crisis on bank credit to the private sector for a panel of developing, developed, and transition economies for the period 1970-1998. The model illustrates how the behavior of the bank credit function changes during a banking crisis,...

Banking crises are rare events that break out in the midst of credit intensive booms and bring about particularly deep and long-lasting recessions. This paper attempts to explain these phenomena within a textbook DSGE model that features a non-trivial banking sector. In the model, banks are...

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

This paper studies episodes in which aggregate bank credit contracts alongside expanding economic activity-credit reversals. Using data for 179 countries during 1960-2017, the paper finds that reversals are a relatively common phenomenon--on average, they occur every five years. By comparison,...