We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral statelevel environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral statelevel environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral statelevel environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral statelevel environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other...

This chapter considers alternatives to the Armington formulation of international trade found in most computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. International trade structures consistent with the monopolistic competition models suggested by Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) are presented in a...

This paper documents Version 1.0 of the Climate PoLicy ANalysis (C-PLAN) model and presents results for the model's baseline and a policy scenario. The C-PLAN model is a global, recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model tailored to the economic and emissions characteristics of...