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Contract design with limited commitment
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013
used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351
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Contract Design with Limited Commitment
Wambach, Achim - 2019
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895796
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Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435790
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086457
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - Department of Economics, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074900
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Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2019
relational contract could establish cooperation through peer monitoring even under relative performance evaluation, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
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Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512
contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Warneryd, Karl - 2021
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315559