This paper studies the relation between the structure of monitoring hierarchies and corruption, i.e., the expected number of bribed members. The model allows for internal corruption, a form of collusion eliminating accountability (monitoring) in the hierarchy. It is shown that the number of...

This paper studies screening and signaling roles of the offer wage and investigates its impact on matching efficiency. It develops a matching model of a large job market populated by observationally indistinguishable, heterogeneous firms and workers. Heterogeneity is introduced in the simplest...

This paper studies screening and signaling roles of the offer wage and investigates its impact on matching efficiency. It develops a matching model of a large job market populated by observationally indistinguishable, heterogeneous firms and workers. Heterogeneity is introduced in the simplest...

We study the problem of controlling bribery at minimum incentives cost in a four-layer, principal-supervisor-agent-client, model of public office. The model includes a second check of corruption by an incorruptible detector such as an outside inspector, the media or any whistle-blower. We...

The intensity of supervision, defined as the proportion of supervisors to bottom-rank productive workers, differs widely across organizations and nations. Analysing three monitoring systems that differ in their supervision intensity, I show that the possibility of collective shirking...

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of grace periods in the context of an overhang of external debt creating a tax on domestic investment. The grace period arises as a Nash equilibrium strategy of the creditor in a dynamic, non- cooperative game. Its length is shown to depend on the...

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single-play matching model with two-sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) 'good' jobs offer premia if 'high-quality' worker population is large;...

The intensity of supervision, defined as the proportion of supervisors to bottom-rank productive workers, differs widely across organizations and nations. Analysing three monitoring systems that differ in their supervision intensity, I show that the possibility of collective shirking...

We study the role of switching costs in a dynamic buyer-seller relationship where quality is not contractible and the sellers retain private information about their quality-relevant abilities. In this environment buyer switching costs increase the seller's bargaining power in negotiations for...