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Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kaplow, Louis - 2021

This paper explores how optimal enforcement is affected by the fact that not all individuals are equally easy to apprehend. When the probability of apprehension is the same for all individuals, optimal sanctions will be maximal: as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, raising sanctions and reducing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246066

Culture and prevalence of sanctioning institutions

Gürdal, Mehmet Y.; Gürerk, Özgür; Yahşi, Mustafa - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 92 (2021), pp. 1-20

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643570

Prison sentencing and criminal activity : a dynamic model

Pelletan, Jacques - In: Revue d'économie politique 130 (2020) 4, pp. 659-681

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643805

Cartel behavior and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences

Wein, Thomas - 2020

Becker's theory of crime, penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. For example, we start by … multiplying cartel infringement by the reciprocal of the probability of detection and punishment. When we factor in expected … personal benefits. In theory, deterrence to participate in cartel activities must be based both on the incentives of firms as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253812

Optimal non-prosecution agreements and the reputational effects of convictions

Mungan, Murat C. - In: International review of law and economics 59 (2019), pp. 57-64

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297649

A generalized model for reputational sanctions and the (ir)relevance of the interactions between legal and reputational sanctions

Mungan, Murat C. - In: International review of law and economics 46 (2016), pp. 86-92

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625314

On punishment severity and crime rates

Friehe, Tim; Miceli, Thomas J. - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687520

Endogenous sanctioning institutions and migration patterns : experimental evidence

Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Katz, Gabriel; Meraglia, Simone - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 158 (2019), pp. 575-606

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138647

Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474901

Sanctions

Eaton, Jonathan - 1990

Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) takes to influence the actions of another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used, for example, by creditors to get a foreign sovereign to repay debt or by one government to influence the human rights, trade, or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475634