Tiebout's basic claim was that when public goods are local, competition between jurisdictions solves the free riding problem in the sense that equilibria exist and are always Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, the literature does not quite support this conjecture. For finite economies, one must...

Markets are often characterized with firms of differing capabilities with more efficient firms licensing their technology to lesser firms. We examine the effects that the amount of the technology transferred, and the characteristics of the partner have on this licensing. We find that a partial...

We endogenize the formation of domestic trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm. The foreign firm can undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) in the domestic market should trade policies become too stringent. We model trade policy formation as a common agency...

We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on...

In 1984 GM and Toyota began the joint production of automobiles to much controversy over its anti-competitive effects. The argument for the joint production was the considerable efficiency gains GM would obtain. Since then, the anti-trust controversy has died, but a question remains: Why would...