In the discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation (Bahel and Trudeau in Int J Game Theory 42:439–460, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2013a</CitationRef>), we study the implications of a number of properties that strengthen the well-known dummy axiom. Our main axiom, which requires that costless units of demands do not...</citationref>

The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the...

This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases with the first-period emissions, we examine the issue of coalition formation...

This paper proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: Additivity and Dummy. We show that these properties are insuffcient to guarantee a unit-flow representation similar to that of Wang (1999)....

In the discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation (Bahel and Trudeau (IJGT, 2013)), we study the implications of a number of properties that strengthen the well-known Dummy axiom. Our main axiom, which requires that costless units of demands do not affect the cost shares, is used...