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On the value of influence activities for capital budgeting

Laux, Volker - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 65 (2008) 3/4, pp. 625-635

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003716968

On the benefits of allowing CEOs to time their stock option exercises

Laux, Volker - In: The Rand journal of economics 41 (2010) 1, pp. 118-138

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974284

Effects of litigation risk on board oversight and CEO incentive pay

Laux, Volker - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 56 (2010) 6, pp. 938-948

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Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment

Laux, Volker - In: Journal of financial economics 106 (2012) 3, pp. 513-526

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009710166

Pay convexity, earnings manipulation, and project continuation

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Board independence and CEO turnover

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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003661395

Board independence and CEO turnover

Laux, Volker (contributor) - 2005

It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a...