Since Herron and Shotts (2003a; hereinafter HS), Adolph and King (2003; hereinafter AK), and Herron and Shotts (2003b; hereinafter HS2), the four of us have iterated many more times, learned a great deal, and arrived at a consensus on this issue. This paper describes our joint recommendations for how to run...

We take this opportunity to comment on Herron and Shotts (2003; hereinafter HS) because of its interesting and productive ideas and because of the potential to affect the way a considerable body of practical research is conducted. This article, and the literature referenced therein, is based on the...

What effects do interest groups have on the democratization and legitimacy of the European Union (EU)? Interest groups can democratize the EU only to the extent that they do not replicate inequalities. We use a newly constructed database to look for inequalities: Are the big organizations in...

Although many study the effects of different allocations of health policy authority, few ask why countries assign responsibility over different policies as they do. We test two broad theories: fiscal federalism, which predicts rational governments will concentrate information-intensive...

We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role...