It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

I provide a full characterization of the set of absolutely expedient learning rules introduced in Börgers et al. [2 …

opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their … information they consult before making their choices. We use these data to estimate learning types using finite mixture models … find that learning depends on network position. Participants in more complex environments (with more network neighbors …

affiliation-motivated individuals engaged in game-play. The first model captures learning by motivated agents during strategic …

understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …