This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner's dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information. I consider a continuous time repeated prisoner's dilemma game where...

We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. In such games, players receive only noisy private signals about each other's actions. For a fixed discount factor, we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in nearly...

This paper presents a simple equilibrium model in which collateralized credit emerges endogenously. Just like in repos, individuals cannot commit to the use of collateral as a guarantee of repayment, and both lenders and borrowers have incentives to renege. Our theory provides a micro-foundation...

This paper presents a simple and tractable equilibrium model of repos, where collateralized credit emerges under limited commitment. We show that even if there is no time variation in fundamentals, repo markets can fluctuate endogenously over time. In our theory, repo market fragilities are...

This paper presents a simple and tractable equilibrium model of repos, where collateralized credit emerges under limited commitment. We show that even if there is no time variation in fundamentals, repo markets can fluctuate endogenously over time. In our theory, repo market fragilities are...

This paper presents a simple and tractable equilibrium model of repos, where collateralized credit emerges under limited commitment. We show that even if there is no time variation in fundamentals, repo markets can fluctuate endogenously over time. In our theory, repo market fragilities are...

We compare Transparency and Privacy in credit markets. A long-lived borrower, who has a risky investment opportunity, seeks loans from a sequence of short-lived lenders. Under Transparency, all the information about the past investment outcomes is shared among the future lenders, which helps the...

This paper presents a simple and tractable equilibrium model of repos, where collateralized credit emerges under limited commitment. We show that even if there is no time variation in fundamentals, repo markets can fluctuate endogenously over time. In our theory, repo market fragilities are...