Similar Search Results

Endogenous property rights in a hold-up experiment

Erlei, Mathias; Siemer, J. Philipp - In: Metroeconomica : international review of economics 65 (2014) 2, pp. 237-270

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395956

Endogenous property rights in a hold up-experiment

Erlei, Mathias; Siemer, J. Philipp - 2004 - This version: April 2004

In a hold-up experiment designed to test theoretical predictions following from Hart (1995) and deMeza/Lockwood (1998 … deviations from standard theory can be explained by positive reciprocal behavior. In this paper, we replicate the experiment by … experiment shows that the results by SOS crucially depend on the ownership structure being exogenously assigned by the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481425

Endogenous Property Rights in a Hold up-Experiment

Erlei, Mathias; Siemer, Philipp - Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Technische … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487433

Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract

Roider, Andreas - 2004

The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262045

Contracting with Private Information

Hagedorn, Marcus - 2003

This paper adds to the current literature on incomplete contracting that argues that deviating from a complete information, transaction-cost free environment may be may generate valuable insights. We achieve this by assuming bargaining with asymmetric information. We consider the consequences of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262108