Multi-choice games and fuzzy games both deal with the situations where the players have more than two participants levels. Two values have been proposed for the multi-choice games: Hsiao-Raghavan (1993) and Nouweland et al. (1995). The former one depends on an arbitrarily given weight, and Hsia...

Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. it is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes correspondingly with changes in the population structure due to generation...

This paper combines the real options approach with game theory in order to evaluate the convenience to invest in Research and Development (R&D). The evaluation method adopted in this case is not based on the traditional $VAN$ but on the binomial model, which is used for the pricing of financial...

In this paper we propose a static model describing the commercial exploitation of a common property renewable resource by a population of agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the utility of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. Agents aren't assumed to...

Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of Nash equilibria, i.e. concepts of solutions associating to each game a subset of Nash equilibria of this game. Considering only finite games with normal form, we first define the most desirable...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.