This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is an introduction. section we review the existing research on (sequential) pooled auctions. section 3m formalized our model of simultaneous ooled suctions while in the section 4 we derive the equilibrium bidding strategies. Section 5 contains the...

The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries and firm's The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debtholders and equityholders in a game-theoretic...

In Esteban and Ray (1999) we formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to benefit from some productivity enhancing government action (infrastructure, direct subsidies, permissions, in short). The government honestly tries to allocate these permissions to the...

The Olson Paradox referes to the observation that larger groups may be less successful in furthering their interests. We address the paradox within an explicit game-theoretic model of lobbying.

This paper extends the infinitely repeated tariff lobbying game of Pecorino [8] to allow for imperfect monitoring, and revisits the question of how an industry's ability to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by the number of firms in the industry. The paper demonstrated that Pecorino [8]...