We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity...

Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) analytically examine the effects of the countries’ heterogeneity on the international environmental cooperation. They consider two types of countries having different abatement costs in one case and different environmental damages in another case. Furthermore it...

The problem of establishing efficiency in a manufacturer–retailer channel (channel coordination) is extensively discussed in the industrial economics, the marketing and the operations research literature. However, studies considering consumer demand to be simultaneously affected by price and...

A model of partnership formation based on two traits, called beauty and character, is presented. There are two classes of individual and partners must be of different classes. Individuals prefer prospective partners with a high beauty measure and of a similar character. This problem may be...

This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency, the balanced cycle contributions property (BCC), and the axioms related to invariance under a player...

Treating the Field as a Lab: A Basic Guide to Conducting Economics Experiments for Policymaking offers economists, researchers, and policymakers 19 basic principles for conducting experiments in developing-country contexts. In this Food Security in Practice technical guide, Angelino Viceisza...

This study considers an internal production option for a contractor and analyzes its effect on the supply chain decisions when the contractor has innovated and the subcontractor has an incentive for opportunistic behavior. In contrast to the single disclosure threshold in the benchmark scenario...

We demonstrate to decision makers how to optimally make costly strategic pre-investment R&D decisions in the presence of spillover effects in an option pricing framework with analytic tractability. Decisions are modeled as impulse-type controls with random outcome. Two firms face two decisions...

Multidivisional and decentralized firms often operate inefficiently. In most cases, central management's instruments to influence its branches' behavior are limited. Although relative performance evaluation has been argued to be of great use in defining incentive mechanisms, such approaches...

We study cooperative games that arise from the problem of finding shortest paths from a specified source to all other nodes in a network. Such networks model, among other things, efficient development of a commuter rail system for a growing metropolitan area. We motivate and define these games...