The question of how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of … highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of … imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first the Designer defends network connectivity by forming costly links and …

The question how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest … interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect … node defense. In this two-stage game, first the Designer defends network connectivity by forming costly links and …

different predictions for the equilibrium network. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects' farsightedness on their decision …

; Cover Function ; Bargaining ; Symmetric Game ; Network …

, I provide a proposition that generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network … network as in Billand et al (2011). This proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called …

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for … efficient equilibria and shows the prevalence of strategic delays. If the underlying network is either complete or circular …

respect to their network position while their names do not matter. Existence of certain stable network structures is then … empty or complete network are always pairwise stable, stable symmetric networks exist, or stable networks with a connected … pairwise stable network is an NSG if utility is given by Bonacich centrality. …

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form an undirected network with explicit linking costs anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent … sequential network bargaining. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of networks being pairwise (Nash …

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form costly undirected links anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent network bargaining. Assuming …

convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff … requires a condition on bilateral payoffs or, alternatively, that the network is acyclic. Our results hold also for the …