toward equal sharing. Here we tested the hypothesis that it is regret - both material and strategic - which determines how … players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment … show that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play. Specifically, we will turn to the dynamics that unfold when …

(path dependence). -- Ultimatum bargaining game ; Reputation ; Regret ; Learning ; Experiment … toward equal sharing. Here we tested the hypothesis that it is regret - both material and strategic - which determines how … players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment …

trembling-hand perfect equilibrium under selfish preferences even towards the end of our experiment. The likely reasons for our … findings are strategic uncertainty and incomplete learning. …

to split a monetary resource with a hypothetical responder. Our modified bargaining experiment employed rounds and trials …

to split a monetary resource with a hypothetical responder. Our modified bargaining experiment employed rounds and trials …

toward equal sharing. Here we tested the hypothesis that it is regret-both material and strategic-which determines how … players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment … show that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play. Specifically, we will turn to the dynamics that unfold when …

toward equal, sharing. Here, we tested the hypothesis that it is regret—both material and strategic—which determines, how … players adapt their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with, randomly changing strangers. One … the median outcomes in the population. We find that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play, in particular of …