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On International Fisheries Agreements, Entry Deterrence and Ecological Uncertainty

Ellefsen, Hans; Grønbæk Kronbak, Lone; Ravn-Jonsen, Lars - 2014

From a game theoretical perspective, a prerequisite for an international fishery agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect their benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140100

Incomplete Stable Structures in Symmetric Convex Games

Slikker, Marco; Norde, Henk - 2000

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We show that with at most five players the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142629

Learning from a Piece of Pie : The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining

Chiappori, Pierre-André; Donni, Olivier - 2006

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set a parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058235

Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256

Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions : generalized maximands of CES form

Martins, Ana Paula - 2002

This note suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011512976

The myopic stable set for social environments

Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, … - 2017

We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660119

Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions

Brink, René van den; Chun, Youngsub; Funaki, Yukihiko; … - 2021

general games. As a direct translation of the balanced cost reduction property, the axiom of balanced externalities for … possible to the idea behind balanced externalities, we weaken this axiom by requiring that every player's payoff is the same … fraction of its total externality inflicted on the other players. This weakening, which we call weak balanced externalities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487903

Many-to-one matching : externalities and stability

Salgado, Alfredo - 2020

characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195202

On Convexity in Games with Externalities

Alonso-Meijide, José María - 2020

We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel … results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition … contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843918

An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form

Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Yang, Yi-You - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 (2010) 4, pp. 475-487

of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317092