We consider a dynamic three-stage game played by two regulator-firm hierarchies to capture the scale and technological effects of opening markets to international trade. Each firm produces one good sold on the market. Firms can invest in R&D in order to lower their fixed emission/output ratio...

We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a...

Developing countries with comparative advantage in dirty industries face the risk of environmental degradation unless appropriate policy is implemented to curtail industrial emission. Using applied general equilibrium analysis, we examine how trade influences the transfer of environmental...

Policy diffusion refers to the process by which a political innovation like the introduction of a novel emission tax disseminates over time among countries. In order to analyze this issue from an economic point of view we develop a simple two-country-model of the taxation of emissions in...

Unter welchen Umständen ist die strategische Delegation der industriepoltischen Kompetenz von einer zentralen Instanz (z.B. der Europäischen Union) auf regionale Träger (die Mitgliedsländer) vorteilhaft? Während in der bisherigen Literatur die Abwägung zwischen einer Internalisierung...