I present a vertical differentiation model to assess the quality-wise strategy of an incumbent telecommunications operator under open access regimes. I show that it is always profitable for an incumbent subject to wholesale regulation to degrade wholesale quality in a non-recoverable fashion....

In September 2016, the European Commission (EC) published its proposal for a directive establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) - with one key aim being the provision of sufficient incentives for infrastructure investments into high-speed communication networks. Based on a...

This paper studies the incentives of an unregulated monopolist to undertake the socially optimal investment in NGA networks when it takes into account the fact that the NGA deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision concerning both the quality (or equivalently, technology) and the...

Motivation, background and problem statement: Fixed and mobile broadband substitutability has recently been a debate in the telecom industry as the issue affects infrastructure investment decisions of service providers and service obligation regulation decision of telecom authorities. Previous...

Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...

"Open access" regulation mandates openness of conduits (e.g. upgraded cable television) to service providers (e.g. America Online), but policy discussion often suggests that the ultimate goal is openness to advanced content (streaming video, interactive e-commerce, etc.). We introduce a systems...