Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender-receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is robust to the random intervention of a truthful regulator. In addition, intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers while the overall percentage of...

Conditional commitment devices such as price matching guarantees or legal contracts can be highly efficient and improve the outcomes for involved parties. In the context of public goods, however, empirical evidence on the cooperation-enhancing effect of conditional commitments is scarce. In this...

Conditional commitment devices such as price matching guarantees or legal contracts can be highly efficient and improve the outcomes for involved parties. In the context of public goods, however, empirical evidence on the cooperation-enhancing effect of conditional commitments is scarce. In this...

Recent empirical research has demonstrated that countries with higher levels of religiosity are characterized by greater income inequality. We argue that this is due to the lower level of government services demanded in more religious countries. Religion requires that individuals make financial...

We provide experimental evidence that subjects blame others on the basis of events they are not responsible for. In our experiment an agent chooses between a lottery and a safe asset; payment from the chosen option goes to a principal, who then decides how much to allocate between the agent and...

We introduce the contractor game , related to the ultimatum game (UG). The proposer makes an offer , and simultaneously sends a cheap talk message , indicating (possibly falsely) the amount of the offer. The responder observes the message with certainty and the offer with probability p before...

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling and excessive trust in one sender/one receiver cheap talk games with an essentially unique and babbling equilibrium. We extend this setup by adding a second sender into the play and study the behavior of the players both theoretically and...

We study the transmission of risk attititudes in a unique survey of mothers and children in which both participated in an incentivised risk preference elicitation task. We document that risk preferences are correlated between mothers and children when the children are just 7 to 8 years old. This...