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Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players

Neyman, Abraham - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2121-2167). 2002

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024489

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Gerber, Anke; Barberà, Salvador - 2005

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as … reasonable. Our result points out that solutions to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be … resting points for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065652

Partition-based Stability of Coalitional Games

Yang, Jian - 2022

grand coalition, a splintered partition is admissible as an ultimate outcome. Local stability can be reached via a multi …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243443

Modification of shapley value and its implementation in decision making

Zaremba, Leszek; Zaremba, Cezary S.; Suchenek, Marek - In: Foundations of Management : the journal of Warsaw … 9 (2017) 1, pp. 257-222

than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856465

Political Compromise and Endogenous Formation of Coalitions

Gerber, Anke; Ortuño Ortín, Ignacio - 2008

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014221617

The stochastic shapley value for coalitional games with externalities

Skibski, Oskar; Michalak, Tomasz; Wooldridge, Michael J. - In: Games and economic behavior 108 (2018), pp. 65-80

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982747

Game-theoretic principles of decision management modeling under the coopetition

Heiets, Iryna; Oleshko, Tamara; Leshchinsky, Oleg - In: International game theory review 23 (2021) 1, pp. 1-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012600000

Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation

Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; van den Brink, Rene; van der … - 2012

In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of … the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such … value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter extended …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326205

The V L value for network games

Hendrickx, Ruud L. P.; Borm, Peter; Brink, René van den; … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002823091

Associated consistency, value and graphs

Hamiache, Gérard; Navarro, Florian - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 49 (2020) 1, pp. 227-249

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591554