This paper empirically investigates how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit within a bank. Using … an exogenous variation in organizational design, induced by a reorganization plan implemented in roughly 2,000 bank … interference { through which hierarchy affects loan outcomes. …

We exploit a variation in organizational hierarchy induced by a reorganization plan implemented in roughly 2,000 bank … branches in India, to investigate how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit. We find that increased … corruption, highlighting the benefits of hierarchies in restraining rent seeking activities. Overall, our results are consistent …

Can banks trade credit default swaps (CDSs) referenced on their current corporate clients at competitive prices, or are … banks penalized for potentially holding private information? To answer this question we merge CDS trades reported under the … that the same dealer offers to banks and to other investors. We find that banks lending to a corporation purchase CDSs on …

relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether … transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a … private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more …

We model how an information asymmetry between the lending bank and the applying firm about the currency structure of …

Both borrowers and lenders can be socially responsible (SR). Ethical banks commit to financing only ethical projects … for SR borrowers. The matching between SR borrowers and ethical banks reduces the frictions caused by moral hazard … heterogeneous agents (banks). We show that market segmentation improves efficiency and solves the problem of multiplicity of …

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to … asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem … of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore reduces the risk of the bank loan portfolio. However, CVaR regulation …

Bowles and Gintis [2000] that hierarchy and communities are complementary rather than substitute modes of governance …

We investigate how communication within banks affects small-business lending. Using travel time between a bank … evaluate the impact of within bank communication costs on small-business loans. We find that reducing headquarters …