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Constraints on matching markets based on moral concerns
Huesmann, Katharina; Wambach, Achim - 2020
Many markets ban monetary transfers. Rather than exogenously imposing this constraint, we introduce discrimination-freeness as a desideratum based on egalitarian objectives. Discrimination-freeness requires that an agent's object assignment is independent of his wealth. We show that money cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438206
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Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns
Huesmann, Katharina; Wambach, Achim - 2015
concerns. Instead of exogenously restricting transfers on a matching market, we introduce a desideratum based on fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531829
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Facilitating the search for partners on matching platforms : restricting agents' actions
Kanoria, Yash; Saban, Daniela - 2017
Two-sided matching platforms can control and optimize over many aspects of the search for partners. To understand how … matching platforms should be designed, we introduce a dynamic two-sided search model with strategic agents who must bear a cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870575
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Transparency and fairness in school choice mechanisms
Hermstrüwer, Yoan - 2019
assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041733
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Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns
Huesmann, Katharina - 2015
concerns. Instead of exogenously restricting transfers on a matching market, we introduce a desideratum based on fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021759
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Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
Che, Yeon-Koo - 2015
We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018428
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Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets
Che, Yeon-Koo - 2015
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018433
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Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 239-271
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855867
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Matching, Auctions, and Market Design
Jackson, Matthew O. - 2013
I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082184
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Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets
Celebi, Oguzhan - 2020
In many centralized matching markets, agents' property rights over objects are derived from a coarse transformation of … stable matching mechanisms, the optimal design can be attained by splitting agents into at most three indifference classes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849357