This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...

This paper discusses the key regulatory, market and political failures that led to the 2008-2009 United States financial crisis. While Congress was fixing the Savings and Loan crisis, it failed to give the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac normal bank supervisory power. This was a...

In this paper we model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...

The concept of regulatory systemic risk – a long-term imbalance, resulting from the misalignment between regulatory initiatives and market realities, that impacts multiple areas of the regulatory framework – is developed in the context of US securities regulation. The discussion offers two...

This paper takes a look at two areas where the subprime crisis has triggered debate and is paving the way for possible movement towards greater global regulation: international banking supervision and the role of credit rating agencies. It surveys the varied range of opinions on the role that...

U.S. financial regulation has traditionally made functional and institutional regulation roughly equivalent. However, the gradual shift away from Glass-Steagall and the introduction of the Financial Modernization Act (FMA) generated a disorderly mix of functions and products across institutions,...

This paper examines the legal basis for the Federal Reserve Board's actions relating to the acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan in March of 2008 and other measures taken by the Board to support the U.S. financial system at that time

Economists have dominated U.S. scholarship about the S&L debacle and they have universally viewed the regulatory response as horrific. This paper argues that the conventional economic wisdom is badly flawed. The U.S. regulatory response to the debacle was disastrous – when economists shaped it...